Topics
Explore
Featured Insight
Sri Lanka’s IMF programme was supposed to succeed by improving governance. Will it?
On June 12, the IMF board will sign off on Sri Lanka’s third disbursement under the current programme. But Sri Lanka is still failing on the governance improvements that are foundational for its economic recovery. According to the latest update of the ‘IMF Tracker’ by Verité Research, Sri Lanka verifiably failed to meet 25% of the commitments due by the end of May 2024 under the programme renewed in December 2023. Of the 63 commitments due, 32 were classified as ‘met’, 16 as ‘not met’, and 15 as ‘unknown’ – meaning data was not available to verify the status. The prognosis of failing on governance comes from examining the 16 commitments that were ‘not met’. 7 of them were on financial management, 6 on financial transparency, and 3 on anti-corruption measures. Sri Lanka is failing to comply with the IMF programme precisely on the aspects that were diagnosed as the root causes of the economic crisis – problems of financial transparency, management and corruption. Many of the commitments not complied with at the second disbursement were also related to actions on transparency and anti-corruption. The governance diagnostic assessment (GDA) led by the IMF, published in September 2023, was the first-ever IMF-led GDA for an Asian country. It also aligned closely with a separate GDA published by Sri Lanka’s civil society. The hope was that this 17th IMF programme would decisively solve Sri Lanka’s economic woes by dealing with the root causes of corruption and mal-governance. However, the lack of progress on these actions – which are now being repeatedly glossed over in programme renewal – suggests that the IMF is not giving adequate weightage to compliance with the governance commitments. The standard fiscal measures to which the IMF has given higher weightage are those that were present in the 16 previous IMF programmes as well. What is distinctive about the current programme is the focus on meaningful measures to improve transparency and anti-corruption. If these measures do not become the foundation of Sri Lanka’s economic recovery, it will be a missed opportunity that then fosters the cycles of the past – which is to return Sri Lanka to yet another IMF programme within five years of completing the previous. Case example of serial default on governance commitments The staff-level agreement signed in September 2022 committed Sri Lanka to “An online transparency platform publishing on a semi-annual basis (i) all significant public procurement contracts, (ii) a list of all firms receiving tax exemptions through the Board of Investment, and (iii) a list of individuals and firms receiving tax exemptions on luxury vehicle imports” by March 2023. Sri Lanka did not comply, even by the end of November 2023. In December last year, when the programme was renewed, this commitment scope was restated as “Publish on a semi-annual basis on a designated website (i) all public procurement contracts above Rs. 1 billion, along with comprehensive information in a searchable format on contract award winners; (ii) a list of all firms receiving tax exemptions through the Board of Investment and the SDP, and an estimation of the value of the tax exemption; and (iii) a list of firms receiving tax exemptions on luxury vehicle import” and it was elevated in importance by designating it a structural benchmark that should be completed by the end of December 2023. However, by the end of May 2024, Sri Lanka was still in serious breach of this long overdue commitment.
Featured Insight
Sri Lanka’s IMF programme was supposed to succeed by improving governance. Will it?
On June 12, the IMF board will sign off on Sri Lanka’s third disbursement under the current programme. But Sri Lanka is still failing on the governance improvements that are foundational for its economic recovery. According to the latest update of the ‘IMF Tracker’ by Verité Research, Sri Lanka verifiably failed to meet 25% of the commitments due by the end of May 2024 under the programme renewed in December 2023. Of the 63 commitments due, 32 were classified as ‘met’, 16 as ‘not met’, and 15 as ‘unknown’ – meaning data was not available to verify the status. The prognosis of failing on governance comes from examining the 16 commitments that were ‘not met’. 7 of them were on financial management, 6 on financial transparency, and 3 on anti-corruption measures. Sri Lanka is failing to comply with the IMF programme precisely on the aspects that were diagnosed as the root causes of the economic crisis – problems of financial transparency, management and corruption. Many of the commitments not complied with at the second disbursement were also related to actions on transparency and anti-corruption. The governance diagnostic assessment (GDA) led by the IMF, published in September 2023, was the first-ever IMF-led GDA for an Asian country. It also aligned closely with a separate GDA published by Sri Lanka’s civil society. The hope was that this 17th IMF programme would decisively solve Sri Lanka’s economic woes by dealing with the root causes of corruption and mal-governance. However, the lack of progress on these actions – which are now being repeatedly glossed over in programme renewal – suggests that the IMF is not giving adequate weightage to compliance with the governance commitments. The standard fiscal measures to which the IMF has given higher weightage are those that were present in the 16 previous IMF programmes as well. What is distinctive about the current programme is the focus on meaningful measures to improve transparency and anti-corruption. If these measures do not become the foundation of Sri Lanka’s economic recovery, it will be a missed opportunity that then fosters the cycles of the past – which is to return Sri Lanka to yet another IMF programme within five years of completing the previous. Case example of serial default on governance commitments The staff-level agreement signed in September 2022 committed Sri Lanka to “An online transparency platform publishing on a semi-annual basis (i) all significant public procurement contracts, (ii) a list of all firms receiving tax exemptions through the Board of Investment, and (iii) a list of individuals and firms receiving tax exemptions on luxury vehicle imports” by March 2023. Sri Lanka did not comply, even by the end of November 2023. In December last year, when the programme was renewed, this commitment scope was restated as “Publish on a semi-annual basis on a designated website (i) all public procurement contracts above Rs. 1 billion, along with comprehensive information in a searchable format on contract award winners; (ii) a list of all firms receiving tax exemptions through the Board of Investment and the SDP, and an estimation of the value of the tax exemption; and (iii) a list of firms receiving tax exemptions on luxury vehicle import” and it was elevated in importance by designating it a structural benchmark that should be completed by the end of December 2023. However, by the end of May 2024, Sri Lanka was still in serious breach of this long overdue commitment.
Featured Insight
Sri Lanka’s IMF programme was supposed to succeed by improving governance. Will it?
On June 12, the IMF board will sign off on Sri Lanka’s third disbursement under the current programme. But Sri Lanka is still failing on the governance improvements that are foundational for its economic recovery. According to the latest update of the ‘IMF Tracker’ by Verité Research, Sri Lanka verifiably failed to meet 25% of the commitments due by the end of May 2024 under the programme renewed in December 2023. Of the 63 commitments due, 32 were classified as ‘met’, 16 as ‘not met’, and 15 as ‘unknown’ – meaning data was not available to verify the status. The prognosis of failing on governance comes from examining the 16 commitments that were ‘not met’. 7 of them were on financial management, 6 on financial transparency, and 3 on anti-corruption measures. Sri Lanka is failing to comply with the IMF programme precisely on the aspects that were diagnosed as the root causes of the economic crisis – problems of financial transparency, management and corruption. Many of the commitments not complied with at the second disbursement were also related to actions on transparency and anti-corruption. The governance diagnostic assessment (GDA) led by the IMF, published in September 2023, was the first-ever IMF-led GDA for an Asian country. It also aligned closely with a separate GDA published by Sri Lanka’s civil society. The hope was that this 17th IMF programme would decisively solve Sri Lanka’s economic woes by dealing with the root causes of corruption and mal-governance. However, the lack of progress on these actions – which are now being repeatedly glossed over in programme renewal – suggests that the IMF is not giving adequate weightage to compliance with the governance commitments. The standard fiscal measures to which the IMF has given higher weightage are those that were present in the 16 previous IMF programmes as well. What is distinctive about the current programme is the focus on meaningful measures to improve transparency and anti-corruption. If these measures do not become the foundation of Sri Lanka’s economic recovery, it will be a missed opportunity that then fosters the cycles of the past – which is to return Sri Lanka to yet another IMF programme within five years of completing the previous. Case example of serial default on governance commitments The staff-level agreement signed in September 2022 committed Sri Lanka to “An online transparency platform publishing on a semi-annual basis (i) all significant public procurement contracts, (ii) a list of all firms receiving tax exemptions through the Board of Investment, and (iii) a list of individuals and firms receiving tax exemptions on luxury vehicle imports” by March 2023. Sri Lanka did not comply, even by the end of November 2023. In December last year, when the programme was renewed, this commitment scope was restated as “Publish on a semi-annual basis on a designated website (i) all public procurement contracts above Rs. 1 billion, along with comprehensive information in a searchable format on contract award winners; (ii) a list of all firms receiving tax exemptions through the Board of Investment and the SDP, and an estimation of the value of the tax exemption; and (iii) a list of firms receiving tax exemptions on luxury vehicle import” and it was elevated in importance by designating it a structural benchmark that should be completed by the end of December 2023. However, by the end of May 2024, Sri Lanka was still in serious breach of this long overdue commitment.
Featured Insight
Sri Lanka’s IMF programme was supposed to succeed by improving governance. Will it?
On June 12, the IMF board will sign off on Sri Lanka’s third disbursement under the current programme. But Sri Lanka is still failing on the governance improvements that are foundational for its economic recovery. According to the latest update of the ‘IMF Tracker’ by Verité Research, Sri Lanka verifiably failed to meet 25% of the commitments due by the end of May 2024 under the programme renewed in December 2023. Of the 63 commitments due, 32 were classified as ‘met’, 16 as ‘not met’, and 15 as ‘unknown’ – meaning data was not available to verify the status. The prognosis of failing on governance comes from examining the 16 commitments that were ‘not met’. 7 of them were on financial management, 6 on financial transparency, and 3 on anti-corruption measures. Sri Lanka is failing to comply with the IMF programme precisely on the aspects that were diagnosed as the root causes of the economic crisis – problems of financial transparency, management and corruption. Many of the commitments not complied with at the second disbursement were also related to actions on transparency and anti-corruption. The governance diagnostic assessment (GDA) led by the IMF, published in September 2023, was the first-ever IMF-led GDA for an Asian country. It also aligned closely with a separate GDA published by Sri Lanka’s civil society. The hope was that this 17th IMF programme would decisively solve Sri Lanka’s economic woes by dealing with the root causes of corruption and mal-governance. However, the lack of progress on these actions – which are now being repeatedly glossed over in programme renewal – suggests that the IMF is not giving adequate weightage to compliance with the governance commitments. The standard fiscal measures to which the IMF has given higher weightage are those that were present in the 16 previous IMF programmes as well. What is distinctive about the current programme is the focus on meaningful measures to improve transparency and anti-corruption. If these measures do not become the foundation of Sri Lanka’s economic recovery, it will be a missed opportunity that then fosters the cycles of the past – which is to return Sri Lanka to yet another IMF programme within five years of completing the previous. Case example of serial default on governance commitments The staff-level agreement signed in September 2022 committed Sri Lanka to “An online transparency platform publishing on a semi-annual basis (i) all significant public procurement contracts, (ii) a list of all firms receiving tax exemptions through the Board of Investment, and (iii) a list of individuals and firms receiving tax exemptions on luxury vehicle imports” by March 2023. Sri Lanka did not comply, even by the end of November 2023. In December last year, when the programme was renewed, this commitment scope was restated as “Publish on a semi-annual basis on a designated website (i) all public procurement contracts above Rs. 1 billion, along with comprehensive information in a searchable format on contract award winners; (ii) a list of all firms receiving tax exemptions through the Board of Investment and the SDP, and an estimation of the value of the tax exemption; and (iii) a list of firms receiving tax exemptions on luxury vehicle import” and it was elevated in importance by designating it a structural benchmark that should be completed by the end of December 2023. However, by the end of May 2024, Sri Lanka was still in serious breach of this long overdue commitment.
Data
Reports
Acts and Gazettes
Insights
Dashboards
Annual Budget Dashboard
Budget Promises
Fiscal Indicators
Fuel Price Tracker
IMF Tracker
Infrastructure Watch
PF Wire
About Us
EN
English
සිංහල
தமிழ்
;
Thank You
Free and Open Access to
Public Finance Data and Analysis
Home
Insights
All
Agriculture and Irrigation
Articles
Budget 2021
Budget 2022
Budget 2023
Budget 2024
Civil Administration
Debt
Defence and Public Order
Education
Employee Provident Fund (EPF)
Energy and Water Supply
Environment
Expenditure
Financing
Health
International Monetary Fund
Revenue
Social Protection and Welfare
Transport and Communication
Urban Development and Housing
Tags
Deficit Financing
All
Action Plan
Actual
Annual Report
Appropriation Bill
Asset Management
Audit
Bank
Bonds
Budget
Central Bank of Sri Lanka
Compensation
COPF
Corporate
Covid
Customs Duty
Customs
Debt Management
Debt
Deficit Financing
Development
Disaster
Elections
Employee Provident Fund
Employment
EPF
ESC
Estimate
Excise
Expenditure
External Debt
Finance Act
Financing
Fiscal Policy
Gaming Tax
Gazette
Grant
Health
IMF
Income Tax
Loans
Macroeconomics
Ministry of Finance
Motor Vehicles
National Evaluation Policy
NBT
PAL
Parliament
Performance Report
Procurement
Progress Report
Project Progress
Provincial Council Budget
Public Finance
Remuneration
Reserves
Revenue
Scams
SCL
SOEs
Stamp Duty
State-Owned Enterprises
Tax Exemptions
Tax Incentives
Tax Reforms
Tax Revenue
Tax
Telecommunication Levy
Tobacco
VAT
Data
Reports
Acts and Gazettes
Insights
Filter by year
From
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
To
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Financing of the Budget Deficit, 2010 to 2022
The following infographic depicts the financing of the budget deficit from 2010 to 2022 estimates as presented in the 2022 budget.
2021-11-23
View Insight*
